

# Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	xi
<i>List of Tables</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
<b>1 Constitutional Justice in the Americas at the Turn of the Millennium</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Recent Trends in the Design of Constitutional Justice Systems	4
1.2. Constitutional Governance Theory in a Nutshell	8
1.3. Constitutional Ferment in 19 Latin American Countries, 1975–2009	11
1.4. Contributions	15
1.5. Looking Ahead	17
<b>2 Judicial Power and the Design of Constitutional Justice</b>	<b>19</b>
2.1. Understanding and Measuring Judicial Power	20
2.2. Disaggregating Judicial Power	22
2.2.1. Autonomy	23
2.2.2. Authority	28
2.2.3. Interacting Autonomy and Authority	30
2.3. Uneven Growth of Judicial Power in Latin America	31
2.3.1. Using the Quantitative Measure to Describe the Region	31
2.3.2. Qualitative Overview of Regional Trends	36
2.3.3. Individual Countries	40
2.4. Correlation or Causation: Do Formal Institutions Matter?	43
2.5. Conclusion	47

<b>3</b>	<b>Constitutional Governance and the Politics of Judicial Design</b>	<b>49</b>
3.1.	Putting Existing Theories on the Same Plane	50
3.2.	A Unifying Theory: Courts as Mechanisms of Constitutional Governance	55
3.3.	Principles of Design for Constitutional Governance	57
3.4.	Alternative Logics	60
3.4.1.	Diffusion of Regional and Period Models	61
3.4.2.	Learning	62
3.4.3.	Regime-Specific Logics (Legitimacy)	63
3.5.	Conclusion	64
<b>4</b>	<b>Identifying the Political Origins of Constitutional Justice through Quantitative Analysis</b>	<b>66</b>
4.1.	From Theory to Hypotheses to Operationalization	67
4.1.1.	First Principle: The Ruling Coalition and the Scope of Authority	69
4.1.2.	Second Principle: The Originating Coalition and the Constitutional Governance Coalition	72
4.2.	Alternative Explanations	73
4.2.1.	Testing for Learning	73
4.2.2.	Testing for Diffusion	75
4.2.3.	Testing for Authoritarian Preferences	75
4.3.	Results	75
4.3.1.	The Courts' Scope of Authority	76
4.3.2.	Ex Ante Autonomy	80
4.3.3.	Ex Post Autonomy	82
4.3.4.	Combining the Three Dimensions	84
4.4.	Illustrative Cases	87
4.5.	Implications	88
<b>5</b>	<b>Guatemala (1985): Building Constitutional Justice in the Shadow of Civil War</b>	<b>95</b>
5.1.	The History of Guatemala's Constitutional Justice System	96
5.2.	Key Features of the 1985 System of Constitutional Justice	106
5.3.	The Emergence of a Robust and Autonomous System in Guatemala	110
5.3.1.	The Originating Coalition and the Construction of the CGC	111
5.3.2.	The Originating Coalition and the Scope of Constitutional Justice	118

5.3.3.	Social Constitutionalism and the Boundaries of Constitutional Justice for Private Property	122
5.3.4.	Other Logics at Work	128
5.4.	Other Constitutions with Similar Features	129
5.5.	Conclusion	134
<b>6</b>	<b>Argentina (1994): Negotiating a Plural Space of Constitutional Justice</b>	<b>135</b>
6.1.	The History of Argentina's Constitutional Justice System	136
6.2.	Key Features of the 1994 System of Constitutional Justice	149
6.3.	The Emergence of a Social Democratic System of Constitutional Justice in Argentina in 1994	152
6.3.1.	The Originating Coalition	153
6.3.2.	The Construction of Constitutional Governance	157
6.3.3.	Other Logics at Work	170
6.4.	Other Constitutions with Similar Features	172
6.5.	Conclusion	176
<b>7</b>	<b>Bolivia (2009): Governance Logic in the New Constitutionalism</b>	<b>178</b>
7.1.	Bolivia's Constitutional History	180
7.2.	Constitutional Governance and the Design of Bolivia 2009	190
7.2.1.	The Originating Coalition	190
7.2.2.	The New System of Constitutional Justice	198
7.2.3.	Bolivia 2009's Design and the Logic of Constitutional Governance	204
7.3.	Other Constitutions with Similar Features	208
7.4.	Conclusion	213
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion: The Politics of Constitutional Justice</b>	<b>214</b>
<b>Appendix A: Judicial Power: Concepts and Measures</b>		<b>229</b>
A.1.	General Observations about Creating Institutional Indices	230
A.1.1.	Our Measures Should Be Explicitly Informed by Our Theories	230
A.1.2.	Different Research Questions May Need Different Indices, Even for the Same Institutions	231
A.1.3.	Weighting and Aggregation Rules Should Also Follow Basic Theoretical Principles	232
A.2.	From Concept to Measure: Operationalization	233
A.2.1.	Ex Ante Autonomy	233
A.2.2.	Ex Post Autonomy	235

A.2.3. Authority	237
A.2.4. The Results	240
A.3. Relationship to Existing Accounts of Judicial Power	241
A.4. Judicial Design in Latin America since 1975	247
A.5. Sources for Variables Measuring Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law	249
<i>References</i>	251
<i>Index</i>	261